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Abstract 
Crises occur frequently and in very complex ways however routine 
responses of crisis management often do not follow the changing 
pattern, nature, intensity and scope of crises. Extensive research has 
been accomplished in Europe and North America to create bases for 
creative changes in this field. Common theory and methodology were 
developed and the huge amount of cases was empirically explored to 
this effect. The article brings about core findings on legal, system and 
functional dimensions of crisis management in Slovenia. Its assumption 
is that inconsistent legal and doctrinal solutions, and consequently 
system deficiencies hamper the development of effective and rational 
crisis management. The officials’ fear of innovations that change every 
day routine is not helpful in this process, either. The discourse of the 
article is analytical and prescriptive by its nature.  
 
Keywords: crisis, crisis management (system), legal basis, 
coordination, innovation. 
 
Introduction: conceptualization of the problem 
Crisis analysts (Yehezkel Dror, Patrick Lagadec, Boris Porfiriev, Enrico 
L. Henry Quarantelli, Uriel Rosenthal, Arjen Boin, Paul t'Hart, Bengt 
Sundelius, Eric Stern, Louise K. Comfort and others) agree that this 
phenomenon is changing in terms of both quantity and quality. They 
believe that more crises can be expected in the future (a quantum jump), 
and that crises will be characterized by endemicity (crises will constitute 
a logical opposition to the increasingly complex systems, which will fail 
to meet the high security standards and expectations due to 
technological, financial or political factors), complexity (crises will consist 
of several combinations of crisis events and of causal relations triggering 
them, which means that a crisis permanently reproduces itself in various 
                                                 
1 The article is based upon research project Crisis Management in Slovenia sponsored 
by the Ministry of Defense of Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Research Agency. 
Prof Dr, Head of Defense Research Center, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of 
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forms) (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort, 2001).
2 In other words, according 
to Boin, t'Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2005) crises are a result of several 
causes, interacting in a given time span and producing a risk with 
destructive potential. Porfiriev (2001) believes that future crises will be 
characterized by growing heterogeneity, complexity and insecurity. 
These characteristics refer to the causes, conditions and directions of 
development. However regardless the changing nature of crises, their 
consequences will be fairly conventional; we will continue to assess 
them in terms of victims, damage, risk, urgency, uncertainty, stress and 
decision-making dilemmas.  
 
The administrative repertoire of crisis management preventive and 
intervention strategies is not adapted to the character of present and 
future crises which are, and will continue to be, primarily characterized 
by a complex and intricate structure. The conventional organizational 
forms of co-ordination cannot be used to organize the work of the 
increasing number of different organizations and individuals participating 
in crisis management (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort, 2001: 13–14). 
Scholars agree that the available tools for dealing with crises are 
themselves also facing a crisis.
3 Routine ways of decision-making and of 
the political process need to be thoroughly upgraded. This calls for a 
broader approach to and a reflection on the policies and government 
competencies which should also integrate crisis management.
4  
 
Researchers understand crisis as a situation, in which basic social 
values, norms and structures are at risk, where the time for decision-
making is limited, and which entail uncertainty, stress and frequently 
also the element of surprise (Malešič, 2004: 11–12). Boin and 't Hart 
(2001) define crisis management as the formulation of procedures, 
agreements and decisions which affect the course of a crisis, including 
the organization, preparation, measures and distribution of resources 
needed to control it.  
 
                                                 
2 The last example of such extremely complex event is the Japanese crisis that occurred 
in March 2011. It was triggered by the earthquake, followed by tsunami and nuclear 
disaster.  
3 In the context of the new critical theory of the world risk society, Beck (2008: 5) holds 
that the traditional technologies of risk assessment, management and insurance are no 
longer fully functional. 
4 The most successful attempt seems to be the restructuring of crisis management 
system in Sweden in 2009. A Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency was established to 
enhance and support societal capacities to cope with crises.  Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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One of the key tasks of crisis management is decision-making that 
involves key values trade-offs and political risks (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and 
Sundelius, 2005). Main feature of crisis decision making is interagency, 
intergovernmental and inter-group coordination that prevents 
miscommunication, overlapping of activities and value or organizational 
conflicts between state, private and non-governmental, sometimes 
concurrently national and international crisis management actors.  
 
Empirical evidence 
Researchers around different parts of Europe and North America have 
carried out about one hundred case studies under the auspices of the 
Swedish CRISMART (Crisis Management Research and Training) to 
explore contemporary crises and their management. The research gave 
an emphasis on individual crises caused by natural disasters, epidemical 
conditions, technical errors, human mistakes, political conflicts, terrorist 
attacks and alike, that occurred in different countries. The research was 
multidisciplinary by its nature, mainly involving disaster sociology and 
psychology, international relations, security studies, public administration 
and public policy, and organizational theory. The vast empirical evidence 
allows for theory building across various scientific disciplines and policy 
reflections in huge number of crises.  
Research design 
 
The analyses of crises and crisis management in the framework of 
abovementioned research program have been taking place in Slovenia 
from 2000 on. We selected ten different cases to be explored ranging 
from political crises to natural and man-made disasters (Malesic and 
Brändström 2004, 13-14). Our main assumption was that inconsistent 
legal and doctrinal solutions, and consequently system deficiencies 
hamper the effective and rational crisis management. The officials’ fear 
of innovations that change every day routine is not helpful in this 
process, either.  
 
In the first stage researchers applied a cognitive-institutional approach 
towards crisis decision-making, having in mind, that we should explore 
cognitive capacity of people involved in crisis decision-making and 
institutional framework the decisions are made in (Stern 1999). We used 
four-level model of exploring various cases: (1) installation of individual 
crisis in adequate historical, political, cultural and institutional context; (2) 
general description of the case and time-frame; (3) dissection of crisis on 
specific situations that require decision-making; and (4) use of holistic 
approach, where crisis is seen again as a complex and comprehensive 
entity and not only as a sum of its specific sequences.  
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The following analytical themes were explored (Malesic and Brändström 
2004, 14-18): Crisis preparedness, prevention and mitigation 
(preparedness of crisis managers and their organizations to respond to 
extraordinary events, experiences, psychological readiness, structures 
and plans, ability to identify and to perceive crisis). Leadership (the 
leadership styles and variations: operative or symbolic, concrete and 
personal or more abstract and distant, hierarchical or collegial). Decision 
units (how and where decisions are made in the complex institutional 
systems that are typically engaged in managing a crisis: an individual, a 
small group or whole organizational network, strategic or operative 
decision-makers, (de)centralization of decision-making process). 
Problem perception and framing (the subjective and socially constructed 
aspects of crisis management, a perceived picture of what is happening, 
problem-framing: the role of political considerations and cognitive 
processes). Value conflict (tension and conflict among the various 
values at stake in a crisis situation, parochial vs. social values, dilemmas 
and choices, do crisis actors cope with the real and tangible dilemmas of 
value conflicts that emerge in crisis situations?). Political and 
bureaucratic cooperation and conflict (patterns of convergence and 
divergence, parochialism and solidarity among actors and stakeholders 
in a crisis, cooperation vs. competition or even avoidance). Crisis 
communication and credibility (the relationship between the information 
available, its timely and appropriate procession, and the perception of 
crisis and actions that are taken to solve it; the balance between sorting 
of information and limiting gate keeping, the role of mass media, 
‘credibility trap’, legitimacy). Transnationalization and internationalization 
(the tendency of crises to spill over national boundaries, transnational 
cooperation, international support for new policies and tools for 
regulations). Temporal effects (the time factor in crisis and its impact on 
stress, cognitive rigidity, reliance on past experience, importance of 
cognitive set, stereotyping and importance of short-run values, tolerance 
for ambiguity, sensitivity to others’ perspective and resistance to pull of 
closure, ability to follow feedback). Learning (the ability of crisis 
management structures and individuals to learn: each and every crisis 
offers a vast reservoir of experiences and lessons for future crisis 
planning and training. A fair expectation is that those involved in crisis 
management will draw lessons from the event and will transfer them into 
organizational practices, policies and laws).  
 
By selecting cases and themes, we actually created a matrix that 
allowed us not only to have a thorough insight into individual cases 
(through analytical themes), but also to explore analytical themes 
through various cases. 
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The methods we used were official documents content analysis, mass 
media content analysis, analysis of secondary sources and data, and 
individual and group interviews. Triangulation of methods gave us a 
comprehensive insight into crisis management characteristics at legal, 
doctrinal, system and functional levels. The research was accomplished 
in three stages and we will summarize the findings bellow.  
 
Functional analysis 
Functional analysis revealed (see more in Malešič 2004 and Malesic and 
Brändström 2004) that the authorities in Slovenia have not taken all of 
the necessary precautions to prevent disastrous consequences of 
crises. As a matter of fact some measures are very costly (e.g. 
earthquake safe construction, measures against floods, installation of 
cleaning devices) whereas others were omitted due to subjective 
reasons. Response plans were at least formally there but our analysis 
revealed that the plan as an actual document has limited value in a 
crisis. However, planning as a learning process has proved to be 
important. This is evident by the fact that crisis managers know the 
crucial elements of the plan. The decision-making processes and 
leadership practices were in many cases in contradiction with the rules 
and planned procedures. There was a lot of shifting or simply assuming 
responsibility, improvisations and ad hoc solutions. The perception and 
definition of the crises were largely dependent on previous experiences. 
People who had already experienced a similar crisis, or more of them, 
were prone to develop a so called ‘crisis subculture’
5 and they acted 
according to it. The capacity for timely responses was limited. The 
notification of affected population and general public by the authorities 
was late in several cases. The response of crisis management actors 
was often prompt however they were not notified to intervene in the 
earliest stages of crises. The organizational cooperation was rather good 
in many analyzed cases however, the relationship between different 
actors on the disaster site was not always clear enough. The mix of 
local, regional, state actors, the military and non-governmental actors 
sometimes produced a certain degree of tension and confusion 
regarding the responsibility and competencies. Civil-military cooperation 
in the process of protection, rescuing and help during disasters was not 
at the highest level. There are at least four key factors that have impact 
on the decision whether the military should be engaged in disaster relief 
or not: legal and doctrinal solutions, expectations of the public and 
                                                 
5 We understand crisis subculture as an ability of community that is often affected by 
crises to cope with them in a routine way: Individuals shift from normal to crisis roles, and 
every day norms and rules are replaced by crisis ones relatively smoothly and rapidly.  Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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political elite, willingness of civilian disaster relief structures to ask for 
military help and last but not least the operational preparedness of the 
military to cope with such civilian crises. It seems that in Slovenia civilian 
authorities are reluctant to ask the military for help in case of disasters. 
We witnessed situations in which affected people expected prompt 
assistance of the military however it was provided rather late and in a 
limited scope. However in the last decade the conscript army was 
replaced by an All-Volunteer Force and civil-military cooperation in case 
of disasters improved. The role of mass media in crisis communication 
process was rather important especially in revealing deficiencies of the 
system and creating public pressure to improve the situation. It seems 
that mass media themselves play an ambivalent role in this process – on 
a one hand it is an opportunity to enlarge the audience or increase the 
intensity of media attention, while on the other hand mass media are 
according to the law part of crisis management.
6 The adequate balance 
between their business (profit) interest and crisis communication role 
was not always achieved. Although mass media connected affected 
people with the ‘outside’, normal surroundings, which helped them in 
psychological terms, and reduced uncertainty by providing information, 
mass media also triggered conflicts with authorities and reported in 
sensational manner.
7 The international cooperation does not refer to all 
examined cases, but in some of them it seemed that other countries 
respected international obligations and solidarity did work. Sometimes 
neighbouring and other countries offered even more help than needed in 
a certain case. The level of internationalization of crisis depends on the 
nature and scope of crisis – some crises are not severe and are of local 
scope, others affect regions, the entire country and some of them even 
international community as a whole.
8 The lessons learned to a certain 
extent improved crisis management in Slovenia. Experiences were 
applied to crisis management practices: more investments in some 
prevention measures, adoption of national program and act on the 
protection of environment, improved notification system, psychological 
assistance to affected people and most exposed crisis management 
                                                 
6 Mass Media Act; Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act. 
7 Extremely positive exception of mass media role in crisis was their performance during 
the Slovenian ten-day independence war in June and July 1991. The worst case was a 
communication process during preparation for a potential Y2K crisis.  
8 It is important to emphasize that not only the dimension local-global is an issue but vice 
versa, as well. In the past analysts were more interested in the process of local crisis 
transformation into a global problem, whereas in globalized world a question is frequently 
raised, how global processes influence the emergence of crisis in local environment (e.g. 
pending financial, economic and social crisis). Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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actors and alike. However some lessons were not documented, were 
forgotten and were not embedded in future crisis planning Let alone 
cognitive and institutional barriers to the process, one should not neglect 
the fact that lesson drawing is constrained by the role of these lessons in 
determining the impact that crises have on a society. Simply put, lessons 
learned might easily reveal deficiencies in crisis prevention, 
preparedness and response, a matter not pleasant for incumbent 
leaders (see also Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 2005).  
 
Analysis of legal and doctrinal bases 
The logical question after the first stage of the research was why crisis 
management in Slovenia faces functional difficulties? In the second 
stage we wanted to find the answer through the analysis of legal 
structure regulating crisis management and system analysis in this field 
(see more in Malešič, 2009). The findings of the content analysis of 
relevant legal documents indicate that lack of precision and serious legal 
inconsistencies are hampering the development of effective crisis 
management. This is even more evident in the strategic and doctrinal 
documents. A firm and consistent legal basis is a necessary but by no 
means a sufficient precondition for effective crisis management at the 
national level.  
 
The system analysis reveals the insufficient development of inter-
organizational co-operation, and the inadequate co-ordination of actors 
and promotion of innovative approaches to crisis preparation and 
response. In this respect, the lack of a coordinating mechanism can be 
observed. Such a mechanism would integrate crisis management actors 
at the state, regional and local levels, and could ensure a flexible, 
rational and efficient crisis response.  
 Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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The government policy is not entirely based on the recent achievements 
of individual sectors in the crisis management field and it fails to 
integrate them into a functional entity or even into several functional 
modules which would provide for a crisis response adapted to the 
nature, intensity and scope of a particular crisis.
9 The results of the 
analysis also point to the absence of an umbrella act, i.e. an act on crisis 
management, which would regulate this field, overcome the existing 
situation and enable the establishment of co-ordination structures at the 
national level, e.g. an agency for crisis management. This institution 
should be attached to the executive authorities.  
 
Analysis of experts’ ideas and views 
In the third stage of research we interviewed high-ranking officials to 
explore crisis management grey spots that were not revealed by other 
approaches and methods.
10 In the following section we present the main 
ideas and views of our respondents.  
 
Many common points were found in the respondents' answers. It is 
evident that there is a high level of consensus on the fact that crisis 
management actors in Slovenia have a different understanding of the 
concepts of 'crisis' and 'crisis management'. This can also be seen 
implicitly in their answers. They believe that a sectoral approach to the 
phenomena is prevailing, which is strongly conditioned by the unclear 
and unharmonized legislation. In addition, problems also arise from 
inconsistent application of the legislation. However, the respondents 
were less worried about functional integration and co-operation between 
actors in concrete crisis situations. 
 
The key problem in development of the crisis management system is 
that a bottom-up approach has been used, whereas a top-down 
approach would be more appropriate. Many crisis management actors 
stick to their existing competencies and relations, thereby failing to meet 
the requirements to build a more modern and functional system. Another 
problem is the absence of strategic reflection at the level of the system 
                                                 
9 In case of overwhelming crisis, national structures could be also supported by 
international organizations’ programs such as United Nations’ Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, European Union’s Civil Protection Mechanism, and NATO’s Civil 
Emergency Planning.  
10 Representatives of the following institutions were interviewed: the Administration for 
Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, the Office for Civil Defense at the Ministry of 
Defense, the Slovenian Armed Forces, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health, 
the Public Health Institute, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These institutions are the 
key actors involved in crisis management in the country. Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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as a whole which would allow for different systemic solutions and 
doctrinal groundings. In addition, the role of crisis management related 
expertise is underestimated. 
 
All the respondents observe a need for adequate co-ordination 
mechanisms to integrate the crisis management actors during the stages 
of preparation, response and after a crisis. It is evident that coordination 
is relatively good within practically all the sectors or at least within their 
organizational entities, but the co-ordination among them is insufficient. 
However, the respondents do not agree when assigning authorities to 
the existing organs. Some believe that the National Security Council 
(NSC) could perform the co-ordination function at the national level, but 
what is lacking is the political will; while others believe that the NSC is a 
government advisory body, or a more strategic body, and is therefore 
unsuitable for this function.  
 
Another solution for better coordination could be the National Crisis 
Management Centre (NCMC), which has been operating for several 
years now. The majority of respondents agree that the existing solution, 
whereby the NCMC operates within the Ministry of Defense, is not good. 
Some see the NCMC as primarily a center for logistic, material and 
technical support in the crisis response process, while others are afraid 
that some people understand the NCMC in a broader sense as 
expanding beyond the legal framework, as a kind of super-body, which 
is unacceptable to many actors within and especially outside the Ministry 
of Defense. The NCMC also comprises a cross-sectoral analytical group 
for crisis management. This group could perform the tasks now carried 
out by other cross-sectoral coordinating groups, addressing crises 
partially.  
 
The respondents mainly do not mention the issues of different 
organizational cultures and interpersonal problems. However, they 
observe the introverted nature of sectors, insufficient integration with 
other actors, in particular during planning and preparation. The crisis 
management actors overcome many of these problems during a crisis 
response, but they cannot catch up on everything that has been missed 
in the previous stages. It seems that crisis management could be 
significantly more efficient and rational if adequate systemic and 
doctrinal solutions are found and followed in practice.  
 
The respondents also differ in their proposals for solutions to the existing 
situation. Most agree that we need a cross-sectoral organ, attached to 
the government, and authorized to co-ordinate agents in different 
government sectors. The respondents believe that this would certainly Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
    | 15  
be an opportunity to overcome the residues of the former system of total 
defense, which can still be noticed particularly at the system and 
organizational levels, but less so in the content and the functional 
domains. On the other hand, it seems that the main obstacle to 
introduce crisis management innovations into national security 
structures, lies in high-ranking officials and politicians who are reluctant 
to accept ideas that change every day routine, bring about uncertainty 
and potentially jeopardize their positions. Fear, resistance to changes 
and even conflicts with researchers were experienced during the 
research process.  
  
Conclusion  
Contemporary security crises are ever more characterized by a 
transformation in terms of their quantity and quality. This is reflected in 
the increased number of crises, their endemicity, composition, durability 
and complexity. The effects of big contemporary crises expand beyond 
national borders, refer to different social fields and relate to existing 
social problems which, in turn, exacerbate them. These changes directly 
influence crisis management. The adequacy of conventional 
organizational and co-ordination forms has obviously come into 
question. This situation requires innovation in both politics and crisis 
response capabilities to address the national and international levels of 
the phenomenon. The changed characteristics of crises and crisis 
management are also relevant to Slovenia, which has relatively well-
developed crisis management within individual government sectors, 
although adequate co-ordination between them has yet to be 
established.  
 
The findings of the content analysis of relevant legal documents confirm 
our initial assumption. They indicate that a lack of precision and serious 
legal inconsistencies, and consequently system solutions are hampering 
the development of effective crisis management in Slovenia. This is 
even more evident in the strategic and doctrinal documents. As 
suggested in the responses of the interviewees, at first sight it seems 
that the legal impediments can be overcome in an actual crisis and that 
co-operation can be achieved among all the crisis management actors. 
Nevertheless, improvisation during a crisis response action cannot 
completely do away with the shortcomings stemming from differences in 
understandings of the concepts of crisis, crisis management, and from 
uncoordinated crisis planning. The sterility of the 'crisis' legislation is 
therefore only partially compensated for by the activist improvisation of 
the crisis management actors. However, the problem does not only lie in 
the legal structure and in the derived systemic, organizational and 
consequently also co-ordination solutions. In the preparations for Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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different crises we also encounter an inadequate legal culture, namely 
disrespect of the existing norms, principles and solutions, or the inability 
to fully take advantage of the possibilities they offer. This means that a 
firm and consistent legal basis is only a necessary but by no means a 
sufficient precondition for effective crisis management at the national 
level. A fear of change among high officials and politicians is also an 
obstacle in the process of introducing crisis management innovations.  
 
The analysis therefore reveals a lack of awareness about the changed 
nature of contemporary crises, the insufficient development of inter-
organizational co-operation, and the inadequate co-ordination of actors 
and promotion of innovative approaches to crisis preparation and 
response. In this respect, the lack of a coordinating mechanism can be 
observed. Such a mechanism would integrate crisis management actors 
at the state level and could ensure a flexible, rational and efficient crisis 
response. The Strategy of the National Security of the Republic of 
Slovenia fails to integrate them into a functional entity or even into 
several functional modules which would provide for a crisis response 
adapted to the nature, intensity and scope of a particular crisis.  
 
Conceptual inconsistencies can be observed in the analyzed laws, 
ordinances and regulations. This prevents the framing of a more or less 
unified representation of crisis and of crisis management by the key 
actors in the country. The results of the analysis also point to the 
absence of an umbrella act, i.e. an act on crisis management, which 
would regulate this field, overcome the existing situation and enable the 
establishment of co-ordination structures at the national level, e.g. a 
crisis management agency. This institution should be attached to the 
executive authorities.  
 
The efforts deployed by the government in the crisis management field 
are insufficient. The government is failing to take the initiative and 
implement a top-down approach. Moreover, it is not sufficiently providing 
for the harmonization of ordinances relative to planning in the fields of 
security, military, internal security, and disaster relief. Planning is only 
partially targeted to the concept of crisis planning and it is therefore 
impossible to provide for integrated training including comprehensive 
(simulation) exercises or the testing of different scenarios as foreseen by 
the plans.  
 
The crisis management innovations proposed in the article are only 
partly suitable to solve pending financial, economic and social crisis in 
Slovenia, however these phenomena are related. On the one hand, 
every security crisis occurs in the context of broader social crisis, which Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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exacerbates it (crisis within the crisis) and makes it difficult to solve, 
whereas on the other hand coordinated crisis management effort in 
austerity times could create synergies and reduce entropy within the 
national security system, making it more rational and efficient despite 
budget cuts imposed on various crisis management actors.  
 
Analyzed legal, strategic and doctrinal documents 
Civil Defense Doctrine, Official Gazette of RS no. 56/01. 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. Official Gazette of RS nos. 
33I/91-I, 42/97, 66/00, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06.  
Defense Act, Official Gazette of RS nos. 82/94, 44/97, 87/97, 47/02, 
40/04. 
Disaster Relief Act, Official Gazette of RS nos. 64/94, 28/06. 
Disaster Relief Doctrine, Government of RS, May 30, 2002.  
Foreign Affairs Act, Official Gazette of RS nos. 45/01, 78/03. 
Military Doctrine, Government of RS, June 1, 2006. 
National Disaster Relief Program, Official Gazette of RS no. 44/02. 
Ordinance on National Security Act, Official Gazette of RS nos. 135/04, 
45/05. 
Ordinance on the Organization and Operation of National Crisis 
Management Centre, Official Gazette of RS no. 9/06. 
Police Act, Official Gazette of RS nos. 49/98, 93/01, 79/03, 50/04, 53/05, 
98/05, 78/06. 
Regulation on Defense Plans, Official Gazette of RS no. 11/04. 
Regulation on the Contents and the Elaboration of Plans for Protection 
and Relief Operations, Official Gazette of RS nos. 3/02, 17/06. 
Resolution on the General Long-term Development Program of the 
Slovenian Armed Forces, Official Gazette of RS no. 89/04. 
Resolution on the National Security Strategy, Official Gazette of RS no. 
56/01. 
State Administration Act, Official Gazette of RS nos. 52/02, 56/03, 61/04, 
123/04, 93/05. 
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